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Animal Sentience 2019.273: Packard on Mather on Octopus Mind
[Editorial note: Andrew Packard has reminded me that (among my no doubt countless other editorial
misjudgements) I had declined to publish (when I was editor of ASent’s predecessor and still thriving cousin, BBS) a
paper that Andrew had submitted in 1987 ["The role of behaviour in evolution: A metaselection theory rooted in
pattern recognition"] – a paper that went on to mature into two important published articles in Andrew’s long and
distinguished career (Packard & Cobb 2014; Packard & Delafield-Butt 2014). Not being a teuthologist, I can only plead
that editors of peer-viewed journals are dependent on the expert judgment of their referees, so my guilt is shared!
By way of penance, I have now accorded Andrew more space in his commentary than ASent’s (or BBS’s) default
guidelines decree. – Stevan Harnad]

Keeping hold of Nurse
Commentary on Mather on Octopus Mind

Andrew Packard
Hopkins Marine Station, Stanford University
Abstract: Mather draws from a lifetime devoted to studying individual octopuses in the wild and
in aquaria to combine a natural history account of their actions with an argument from design
adopted from second-, often third-hand sources. The 'distributed' [decentralised] nervous system
said to contrast with that of vertebrates – a premise largely accepted by Mather’s commentators
so far – does not reflect the original literature on motor control, nor the facts of comparative
anatomy, functional morphology and morphogenesis. Ontogeny is absent. With the help of some
old or little-known illustrations from my own participant-observer experimental investigations, I
will try here to unpick threads of the pre-enlightenment embroidery shrouding the argument and
will call into question the use of reductionist language.
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“Read all the pedants’ screeds and strictures;
But don’t believe in anything
That can’t be told in coloured pictures”.
G.K. Chesterton, Lines Written in a Picture Book
“And always keep a hold of Nurse
For fear of finding something worse”.
Hilaire Belloc, Cautionary Tales
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One does not need to quote Kuhn to recognize that the paradigms ruling our particular field are
being wilfully revised. Commenting usefully on this ambitious target article, already difficult for
an ethologist of an upbringing different from that of Mather (2019), is compounded for the
neurobiologist by the absence of a shared immersion in comparative anatomy. For handholds in
this rollercoaster ride, I reach for the literature and for illustrations from my own past studies of
the questions raised: (1) unified behaviour, (2) morphological basis, and (3) feelings.
Thank you to commentator Yoram Gutfreund (2019) for bringing in Niko Tinbergen; and
to Luis Favela (2019) for expanding on the Umwelt [and Umwelten]: “Umwelt is quite appropriate
when used in reference to organisms with a central nervous system, specifically, organisms that
have a single subjective, conscious experience of the world.” (Choreographed by intersubjectivity,
I would wish to add. For a mechanistic exposition of this in terms of 'pattern generation'/'pattern
recognition' interplay, with octopus centre stage, see Packard 1988.) Thanks also to Sergio Pellis
(2019) for recognising that comparison with the nervous system of vertebrates can be used to
argue either way. Schnell & Vallortigara's (2019) attempt to reorient thinking is frontal; mine is
from behind.
0. The unifying role of vision
I have used the classic approach/withdrawal language of Tinbergen and Lorenz to describe the
behaviour of Octopus vulgaris (Packard 1963). This addresses Mather's conjecture that
“octopuses may be guided by two motivational bases, exploration and fear.” Figures 1-3 illustrate
how vertebrate-like learning and current experience affect the selection, deployment and
intensity of the performance (some bilateral differences are just visible), but the postures
themselves come from the rich repertoire of fixed action-patterns common to members of this
species in the wild (Packard and Sanders 1969, 1971; Packard and Hochberg 1977b).

Figure 1. A pair of photographs of a common octopus in experimental tanks of the Naples Zoological Station
captures its unitary response to my participant/observer action of switching off the overhead lights (see
drawing in Packard 1972, figure 19).
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Figure 2. More sophisticated examples of 'voluntary' behaviors controlled by vision, including
copulation, 'courtship' and emotional 'conflict' are seen in Plate 1 of Packard (1963).

Figure 3. A second pair of photos (one of them figure 2 of the Monaco plate) captures the conflict
between the two drives induced by my manipulation of targets associated with acquired positive
and negative emotional signs: in this case, a cooperative, though captive, individual.
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1. The argument from design
The 'argument from design' implicit in Mather's review of the recent 'arm movement' literature
in octopuses replaces a morphogenetic logic with an anthropocentric (engineering) one. In view
of the clear, simple, and ubiquitous evidence of the unifying role of vision in octopus behaviour,
how did the idea gain currency that motor control and mind are distributed fundamentally
differently in cephalopod animals compared to their counterparts in other animals? To gain an
idea of the distribution and interplay of special sense organs and the various higher and lower
centres of the nervous system delivering locomotion in our own species, it is sufficient to consult
relevant chapters in textbooks for medical students, however ancient.
Both Jakob von Uexküll's ‘subjective model of the world’ Umwelt, and Young's (1964,
1978) encoded ‘model’ were built from classical investigations in neuroanatomy, neurophysiology
and experimental psychology. Von Uexküll (1894b) was one of the early workers on the octopus
brain (Eledone), having already contributed to the understanding of peripheral mechanisms of
chromatophore patterning (von Uexküll 1892; see Packard 1995b, Box 21.1) and of nerve impulse
propagation (von Uexküll 1894a).
Figure 4 (below) contrasts Mather’s position and my own. The two are destined to remain
separate, however, if only because Mather’s statement that “we do have enough information to
evaluate how octopuses might have a unity behind the diversity when organizing their world”
(italics added) has an Alice-in-Wonderland ring. The 'robotics' logic inherent in treating a soft body
bearing eight flexible arms as a 'problem' for the octopus (cf. introductory paragraphs of Hochner
2012; Levy & Hochner 2017; Crook & Walters 2014) – rather than just for the engineer/dance
couple – stands upon its head an evolutionary description dating back to the enlightenment!
2. The devil in the details
Are “the dynamics of multiple simple and automatic elements” (Gutfreund 2019), sought by
Hochner and colleagues in the arms of an octopus during oriented exploration of the substrate
(bottom right in the open loop scheme of Figure 4), so different from the kind of “basic operation
of the central pattern-generating circuitry” during 'fictive' locomotion adjustments delegated to
the spinal cord in the decerebrate cat (McCrea 2004, cited by Mather)? This is painful to
contemplate for an Animal Sentience community ethically concerned about those kinds of
studies, yet no amount of observation in the wild can replace the findings of experimental
neurophysiology.
Ostensibly holding onto Nurse, yet setting aside accepted nomenclature and relevant
anatomical facts, the argument from design is supported by summaries of detailed histological
counts of nerve cells in a common octopus specimen of unknown age and body weight (Young
1963) that has become an inflationary mantra for the octopus, intoned by all: “3/5 of their
nervous system in the arms,” etc.
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Figure 4. Summary of functional levels controlling motor output of the chromatophore system
(Boycott 1953; Packard 1995a, pp. 358-361) (above, blue; Packard 1995b) superimposed over the
corresponding box in Mather's alternative scheme (Mather & Dickel 2017) (below).

Young makes it abundantly clear that “considering how they have arisen in evolution …. as they
still do in ontogeny today” (Young 1971, pp. 5-10), the large optic lobes belong with the rest of
the supra-oesophageal mass. The commissures directly linking them across the midline pass
through it. Analogous to the optic commissures of insects with their huge eyes, commissures
uniting the optic tecta of fish and paired cerebral structures elsewhere in the animal kingdom
(mammalian corpus collosum included) are missing from Figure 5 (below) and other versions of
the same diagram. Yet transverse sections of a freshly hatched octopus would be a simple class
exercise to check for their presence.
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Figure 5. (from Hochner 2012, figure 1) Two huge optic lobes serving bilateral eyes in a box that is
separate from that of a 'central brain' in the middle of the head; arm nerve cords (labelled
'peripheral nervous system') are a third box. Young's neuron counts are appended.

Figure 6. Body-weight groups indicated by sagittal brain section outlines (from Packard & Albergoni
1970, p. 540).

Figure 6 (above) puts Young's (1963) estimates in ontogenetic perspective. Over the potential life
history, from first settling on the sea floor to old age, that O. vulgaris specimen (probably 200500 g) would have increased in brain weight and non-polyploid ('diploid equivalent') amounts of
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DNA (~numbers of cell nuclei) by orders of magnitude. At hatching (far left in Figure 6), half of all
cell nuclei in the body are in a fast differentiating brain.
3. Feelings
Where are the feelings we have lost in sensation? Where are the sensations we have lost in
sensory? (See last sentence of this commentary.)
The only work of mine cited by Mather in a 150-strong bibliography is Packard (1972). That
paper is not a primary source for accounts of the brain, nor of the cephalopod chromatophore
system. Sadly, its take-home message – that co-evolution of cephalopods and vertebrates over
fossil time in what I called 'behaviour space', promotes further evolution of that space – has not
really been understood by popularizers (Mather cites Godfrey-Smith, 2017). Mather’s figure 4
draws attention to darkening on the left side of an octopus. Close inspection of the photo reveals
an underlying 'mottle' pattern worn by both sides of the animal; darkening on its left side is due
to one class of chromatophore activity only: neutral density screening (see Packard & Hochberg
1977a figure 1; supplementary cuttlefish movie for Holes in the camouflage; Packard 2010).
More directly relevant is a later review that tackles the otherwise studiously avoided
subject of feelings and their role in shaping the biosphere: Packard & Dellafield-Butt (2014)
suggest that “it is love that makes the world go round!” while at the same time entering into nitty
gritty details of brain chemistry. (Yet, astonishingly, feelings and emotions do not figure in the
target article!)
Mather’s question — “What is in an octopus's mind … motivated to gather information”
— belongs with the reductive bottom-up approach still dominating North American biology, an
approach that deprives discussants of the appropriate language for talking about these things.
'Cognitive' will not do the trick. Nor 'embodiment', I find. My “Contribution to the whole (H)”
(Packard 2006) arose from the need to interpret experimental observations on the properties of
cephalopod skin when nervous control is absent or suppressed. The notion of 'horizontal control'
offers a way around the bottom-up v. top-down difficulty. And helps to free language.

Figure 7. The last two of the series of 'vignettes' described in Packard & Dellafield-Butt (2014) are
Audubon's pair of passenger pigeons from the 19th century and my Naples octopus exhibiting
conflict [perhaps worth a mention in an article on mind?]. The drawing also appears in the section
on welfare of captive animals for the excellent OUP (Oxford University Press) Very Short
Introduction series: Animal Behaviour (Wyatt 2017).
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The young cat in Packard & Dellafield-Butt’s first vignette (p. 334), presenting me with kittens on
my last night in New Zealand, had been brought as a kitten in order to save it from the attentions
of his other cats at home, by A.K. McIntyre (neurophysiologist working with the decerebrate
preparation). That empathy helped inform his laboratory research.
“Construction of models of how the brain works are well and good. But they must be
firmly based on experimental observations and they are only as good as the questions they
raise.” (Proske 2003; obituary for Archie McIntyre)

Brave of you, Jennifer, as well as thoughtful, to invite me to comment. [So may I be forgiven for
lamely paraphrasing T.S. Eliot's “Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the
knowledge we have lost in information” (The Rock)].
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